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INTRODUCTION 
Two of the most high-profile decisions in the Supreme Court’s October 
2010 term were clear victories for freedom of speech. In Snyder v. Phelps, the 
Court considered whether the First Amendment protects the right of protestors to 
go to military funerals to express anti-gay messages.1 Matthew Snyder was a 
Marine who died in military service in Iraq.2 The members of the Westboro Baptist 
Church went to his funeral and, as is their practice, held up signs that condemned 
homosexuality and tolerance for it.3 Snyder’s father sued the demonstrators for 
intentional infliction of emotional distress and intrusion upon seclusion.4 A jury in 
federal district court ruled in favor of Snyder and the judge upheld an award of 
both compensatory and punitive damages.5 
The Supreme Court, in an 8–1 decision, concluded that the imposition of 
liability for such speech violates the First Amendment.6 Chief Justice Roberts, 
writing for the Court, stressed that the speech lawfully occurred on public 
property, did not disrupt the funeral, and involved a matter of public concern.7 The 
Court explained that there are alternatives available to state and local governments 
to protect privacy and sensibility at funerals, such as creating buffer zones around 
them,8 similar to what the Court has permitted around reproductive health care 
facilities.9 The case is important because the Court reaffirmed one of the most 
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    1 131 S. Ct. 1207 (2011). 
    2. Id. at 1213. 
    3. Id. 
    4. Id. at 1214. 
    5. Id.; see also Snyder v. Phelps, 533 F. Supp. 2d 567, 570 (D. Md. 2008). 
    6. Snyder, 131 S. Ct. at 1219–20. 
    7. Id. at 1220. 
    8. Id. at 1218. 
    9. See, e.g., Madsen v. Women’s Health Ctr., Inc., 512 U.S. 753 (1994). 
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basic principles of the First Amendment: speech cannot be punished, or speakers 
held liable, just because the speech is offensive, even deeply offensive. 
In Brown v. Entertainment Merchants Ass’n, the Court, in a 7–2 decision, 
struck down a California law that made it a crime to sell or rent violent video 
games to minors under age 18 without parental consent.10 Justice Scalia, writing 
for the Court, held that the law is an impermissible content-based restriction on 
speech and that the government failed to prove that the law was necessary to 
achieve a compelling purpose.11 In perhaps the strongest language to date, the 
Court spoke of the First Amendment rights of minors and once more refused to 
recognize violent speech as categorically less protected by the First Amendment.12 
The Court made it clear that such attempts by states to restrict the sale or rental of 
violent video games violate the First Amendment.13 
Based on these cases, it is tempting to generalize that the Roberts Court is 
strongly protective of speech. In fact, I recently heard Baylor University President 
Ken Starr proclaim that this is the most free speech Court in American history.14 
As is often the case with generalizations from a small sample, this one is 
inaccurate and hides the reality: the Roberts Court frequently rules against free 
speech claims. 
Part I of this Lecture looks at the Roberts Court’s dismal record of 
protecting free speech in cases involving challenges to the institutional authority of 
the government when it is regulating the speech of its employees, its students, and 
its prisoners, and when it is claiming national security justifications. Part II 
examines a troubling new exception to the First Amendment that the Roberts Court 
has created for government speech—that the government can adopt private speech 
as its own and, accordingly, avoid the First Amendment. Part III analyzes the 
Roberts Court’s aggressive decisions protecting campaign contribution speech. A 
careful examination of these cases reflects the conservative majority’s hostility to 
campaign finance regulations, rather than a pro-speech commitment. 
I am certainly not denying that the Roberts Court sometimes rules in 
favor of free speech claims, as it did in Snyder v. Phelps and Brown v. 
Entertainment Merchants Ass’n. Rather, my claim is that the Roberts Court’s 
overall record suggests that it is not a free speech Court at all. 
                                                                                                            
  10. 131 S. Ct. 2729 (2011). 
  11. Id. at 2738–42. 
  12. Id. at 2734–37. In the prior term, in United States v. Stevens, 130 S. Ct. 1577 
(2010), the Court declared unconstitutional a federal law that prohibited the sale, 
distribution, or possession of depictions of animal cruelty. The Court rejected the 
government’s argument for recognition of violence as a new category of unprotected 
speech. Id. at 1586. 
  13. See Brown, 131 S. Ct. at 2738–42. 
  14. Ken Starr, President, Baylor Univ., Address at the Pepperdine Judicial Law 
Clerk Institute (Mar. 18, 2011). 
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I. THE GOVERNMENT AS AN AUTHORITARIAN  
INSTITUTION AND FREE SPEECH 
The Roberts Court has consistently ruled against free speech claims when 
brought by government employees, by students, by prisoners, and by those who 
challenge the government’s national security and military policies. The pattern is 
uniform and troubling: when the government is functioning as an authoritarian 
institution, freedom of speech always loses. 
A.  Government Employees 
Garcetti v. Ceballos involved Richard Ceballos, a supervising district 
attorney in Los Angeles County, who concluded that a witness in one of his cases, 
a deputy sheriff, was not telling the truth.15 He wrote a memo to this effect and felt 
that he was required by the Constitution to inform the defense of the problems with 
the witness.16 Ceballos alleged that, as a result of this speech, his employers 
retaliated against him, including transferring him to a less desirable position and 
denying him a promotion.17 
The issue before the Court was whether Ceballos’s speech was protected 
by the First Amendment.18 Although the Court has long held that there is 
constitutional protection for the speech of government employees,19 it ruled 
against Ceballos.20 The Court drew a distinction between speech “as a citizen” and 
speech “as a public employee”; only the former is protected by the First 
Amendment.21 Justice Kennedy stated: “[W]hen public employees make 
statements pursuant to their official duties, the employees are not speaking as 
citizens for First Amendment purposes, and the Constitution does not insulate their 
communications from employer discipline.”22 The Court expressed great concern 
about the disruptive effects of allowing employees to bring First Amendment 
claims based on their on-the-job speech.23 Justice Kennedy wrote that allowing 
such claims “would commit state and federal courts to a new, permanent, and 
intrusive role, mandating judicial oversight of communications between and 
among government employees and their superiors in the course of official 
business. This displacement of managerial discretion by judicial supervision finds 
no support in our precedents.”24 The Court observed that civil service protections 
provide safeguards for employees against retaliation for their speech.25 
                                                                                                            
  15. 547 U.S. 410, 413–14 (2006).  
  16. Id. at 414. 
  17. Id. at 415. 
  18. Id. at 413. 
  19. See, e.g., Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563 (1968) (holding that a 
government employee’s speech is protected by the First Amendment if it involves a matter 
of public concern and does not unduly interfere with the functioning of the workplace). 
  20. Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 417. 
  21. Id. at 418–20. 
  22. Id. at 421.  
  23. See id. at 418–23. 
  24. Id. at 423.  
  25. Id. at 425. 
726 ARIZONA LAW REVIEW [VOL. 53:723 
Garcetti was a 5–4 decision and the dissent strongly objected to the 
holding that there is no First Amendment protection for the speech of government 
employees on the job in the scope of their duties.26 The dissent was expressly 
concerned about the whistleblower who exposes wrongdoing in the workplace, 
often benefiting the public, having no protection from reprisals.27 The dissent 
noted that civil service protections are often nonexistent or limited.28 
Garcetti is thus an important limit on First Amendment protections for 
speech by government employees; it is a categorical exception from constitutional 
protection for speech while on the job and in the scope of the employee’s duties. 
The case’s premise that the First Amendment protects only speech “as citizens” 
has no foundation in other case law. For example, in Citizens United v. Federal 
Election Commission, the Court protected the speech of corporations even though 
they, of course, are not citizens.29 The explicit premise of Citizens United is that 
more speech is better whatever the source;30 the effect of Garcetti v. Ceballos is 
that there will be significantly less speech. Moreover, government employees do 
not lose their citizenship when they walk into the government office building. 
Interestingly, the Court was explicit that it was not changing the First 
Amendment law with regard to other speech by government employees.31 The 
Court stated that its holding “relates only to the expressions an employee makes 
pursuant to his or her official responsibilities, not to statements or complaints . . . 
that are made outside the duties of employment.”32 But this leads to the anomaly 
that Ceballos’s speech would have been protected if he had written a memo to the 
Los Angeles Times, but not one to his supervisor.33  
The reality is that the case means that whistleblowers, those who expose 
wrongdoing by others within their workplaces, have no First Amendment 
protection. Although the Court pointed to civil service protections, the dissent 
observed that these protections are often nonexistent or inadequate.34 The result 
will be a significant loss of speech, often speech that can expose wrongdoing 
within the government. 
Another, more recent, example of the government ruling against First 
Amendment claims of government employees was in Borough of Duryea v. 
Guarnieri.35 The Court held that government employees may bring claims under 
the provision of the First Amendment protecting a right to petition the government 
for redress of grievances only if the speech involves a matter of public concern.36 
                                                                                                            
  26. Id. at 428–29 (Souter, J., dissenting).  
  27. Id. at 440–41. 
  28. Id. at 440. 
  29. 130 S. Ct. 876 (2010) (invalidating a provision of federal law limiting 
independent expenditures by corporations and unions in federal election campaigns). 
  30. See, e.g., id. at 904. 
  31. Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 424. 
  32. Id.  
  33. See id. at 430 n.1 (Souter, J., dissenting).  
  34. Id. at 440. 
  35. 131 S. Ct. 2488 (2011). 
  36. Id. at 2501. 
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In other words, claims by government employees under the petition clause face the 
same restrictions as those under the free speech clause of the First Amendment. 
B. Students 
In Morse v. Frederick, the Court held that the First Amendment was not 
violated when a student was punished for displaying a banner with the inscription, 
“Bong Hits 4 Jesus.”37 When the Olympic torch came through Juneau, Alaska, a 
high school released its students from class to watch, and the student unfurled his 
banner.38 The principal, believing that the banner encouraged drug use, confiscated 
it and suspended the student who displayed it.39 
In an opinion by Chief Justice Roberts, the Court, in a 5–4 decision, said 
that the principal could reasonably interpret the banner as encouraging illegal drug 
use and that schools have an important interest in stopping such speech.40 Chief 
Justice Roberts wrote: “The question thus becomes whether a principal may, 
consistent with the First Amendment, restrict student speech at a school event, 
when that speech is reasonably viewed as promoting illegal drug use. We hold that 
she may.”41  
Justice Alito wrote a concurring opinion, joined by Justice Kennedy, 
which stressed the narrowness of the Court’s holding.42 Justice Alito explained that 
the Court was holding only that schools may punish speech that encourages illegal 
drug use. He wrote:  
I join the opinion of the Court on the understanding that (a) it 
goes no further than to hold that a public school may restrict speech 
that a reasonable observer would interpret as advocating illegal drug 
use and (b) it provides no support for any restriction of speech that 
can plausibly be interpreted as commenting on any political or 
social issue, including speech on issues such as “the wisdom of the 
war on drugs or of legalizing marijuana for medicinal use.”43 
Justice Stevens wrote a forceful dissent in which he questioned whether 
the majority’s holding could be cabined so narrowly.44 He expressed concern that 
the Court did not require any showing that the speech would actually increase the 
likelihood of illegal drug use; he observed that it is highly unlikely that any 
student, the smartest or the slowest, would be more likely to use drugs because of 
Frederick’s banner.45 He particularly lamented the abandonment of the prohibition 
                                                                                                            
  37. 551 U.S. 393, 401 (2007).  
  38. Id. at 396. 
  39. Id. 
  40. Id. at 407–10. 
  41. Id. at 403. Justice Thomas wrote a concurring opinion in which he argued 
that the First Amendment does not apply at all in public schools. Id. at 410–11 (Thomas, J., 
concurring). 
  42. Id. at 422 (Alito, J., concurring). 
  43. Id.  
  44. See id. at 441–42 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
  45. Id. 
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on viewpoint discrimination in schools and the requirement of a showing of actual 
disruption to justify punishing student speech.46 
It is difficult to read Morse and see the Roberts Court as protective of free 
speech. The banner at issue in this case was silly and incoherent. There was not the 
slightest evidence that it caused any harm; there was no claim that it was disruptive 
and certainly no evidence that it increased the likelihood of drug use.47 But, the 
conservative majority still ruled against speech and in favor of the government. 
C. Prisoners 
In Beard v. Banks, the Court upheld a Pennsylvania prison regulation that 
prevented some prison inmates from having any access to newspapers, magazines, 
or photographs.48 Justice Breyer, writing for the Court in a 6–3 decision, said:  
The Secretary in his motion set forth several justifications for 
the prison’s policy, including the need to motivate better behavior 
on the part of particularly difficult prisoners, the need to minimize 
the amount of property they control in their cells, and the need to 
ensure prison safety, by, for example, diminishing the amount of 
material a prisoner might use to start a cell fire. We need go no 
further than the first justification, that of providing increased 
incentives for better prison behavior. Applying the well-established 
substantive and procedural standards . . . we find, on the basis of the 
record before us, that the Secretary’s justification is adequate.49 
The Court’s deference to the government was stunning. This is a 
regulation that denies prisoners access to all newspapers, magazines, and even 
family photographs.50 It is hard to imagine a more extensive restriction of First 
Amendment rights. There was no evidence that this actually improves prisoner 
behavior, and in fact, the Court said that none was needed.51 The government’s 
assertion of a benefit was sufficient to justify the restriction on speech.52 
D. National Security 
Perhaps the most troubling First Amendment decision by the Roberts 
Court was in 2010 in Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project.53 Federal law prohibits 
providing “material support” to a “foreign terrorist organization.”54 Material 
support is defined to include such activities as “training,” providing “personnel,” 
and giving “expert advice or assistance.”55 Two groups of Americans brought a 
lawsuit seeking to establish First Amendment protection for their assistance to 
                                                                                                            
  46. Id. at 437. 
  47. See id. at 433–41. 
  48. 548 U.S. 521, 530–31 (2006).  
  49. Id. at 531.  
  50. See id. at 524–26. 
  51. Id. at 534. 
  52. Id. 
  53. 130 S. Ct. 2705 (2010).  
  54. 18 U.S.C. § 2339B (2006).  
  55. Id. § 2339A(b).  
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groups that had been designated by the Department of State as foreign terrorist 
organizations.56 One group of Americans sought to help a Kurdish group, which 
sought to form an independent state, use international law and the United Nations 
to peacefully resolve disputes.57 The other group of Americans sought to help a 
group in Sri Lanka, which similarly aimed to form a separate nation, apply for 
humanitarian assistance.58 
The Court, in a 6–3 decision, ruled that this speech could constitutionally 
be punished.59 Initially, the Court rejected the vagueness challenge to the law, 
concluding that most of the activities of the plaintiffs were clearly within the 
statute’s prohibition of expert advice, assistance, and training.60 The Court then 
concluded that the speech could be punished so long as it was done in coordination 
with a foreign terrorist organization.61 Chief Justice Roberts, writing for the Court, 
stressed that the plaintiffs could speak out on any topic they wished, but if the 
speech was done in concert with a foreign terrorist organization it was not 
protected by the First Amendment.62 He wrote:  
Under the material-support statute, plaintiffs may say anything they 
wish on any topic. They may speak and write freely about the PKK 
and LTTE, the governments of Turkey and Sri Lanka, human rights, 
and international law. They may advocate before the United 
Nations. . . . Congress has not, therefore, sought to suppress ideas or 
opinions in the form of “pure political speech.” Rather, Congress 
has prohibited “material support,” which most often does not take 
the form of speech at all. And when it does, the statute is carefully 
drawn to cover only a narrow category of speech to, under the 
direction of, or in coordination with foreign groups that the speaker 
knows to be terrorist organizations.63 
Justice Breyer’s dissenting opinion, joined by Justices Ginsburg and 
Sotomayor, criticized the majority for allowing the punishment of speech without 
any proof that it was likely to cause harm.64 Justice Breyer reviewed the Court’s 
decisions concerning incitement, especially Brandenburg v. Ohio,65 and said that 
they do not justify allowing punishment of the sort of speech in which the 
plaintiffs sought to engage.66 He explained that prior cases have permitted “pure 
advocacy of even the most unlawful activity—as long as that advocacy is not 
‘directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless action and . . . likely to incite 
or produce such action.’”67 
                                                                                                            
  56. Humanitarian Law Project, 130 S. Ct. at 2713. 
  57. Id. 
  58. Id. 
  59. Id. at 2720–21. 
  60. Id. at 2719–21.  
  61. Id. at 2722. 
  62. Id. at 2722–23. 
  63. Id.  
  64. Id. at 2731–32 (Breyer, J., dissenting).  
  65. 395 U.S. 444 (1969). 
  66. Humanitarian Law Project, 130 S. Ct. at 2732 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
  67. Id. at 2737 (quoting Brandenburg, 395 U.S. at 447). 
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In other words, the Court allowed the government to prohibit speech that 
in no way advocated terrorism or taught how to engage in terrorism solely because 
the government felt that the speech assisted terrorist organizations. The restriction 
on speech was allowed even without any evidence that the speech would have the 
slightest effect on increasing the likelihood of terrorist activity. The deference that 
the Court gave to the government was tremendous and the restrictions it placed on 
speech were great.68 
II. THE GOVERNMENT AS SPEAKER 
The Supreme Court has held that when the government is the speaker, the 
First Amendment does not apply at all or provide a basis for challenging the 
government’s action.69 The Roberts Court affirmed and extended this principle in 
Pleasant Grove City, Utah v. Summum, one of the Roberts Court’s most troubling, 
although unanimous, decisions concerning the First Amendment.70  
Pioneer Park in Pleasant Grove, Utah, has 15 monuments, 11 of which 
were privately donated.71 One of these is a large Ten Commandments monument 
donated by the Fraternal Order of Eagles in 1971.72 Summum, on the other hand, is 
a religious organization founded in 1975 and headquartered in Salt Lake City, 
Utah.73 On two separate occasions in 2003, Summum’s president wrote a letter to 
the Pleasant Grove’s mayor requesting permission to erect a “stone monument,” 
which would contain “the Seven Aphorisms of Summum” and be similar in size 
and nature to the Ten Commandments monument.74 The city refused the request 
and Summum sued.75 Summum claimed that for the city to allow a monument 
from some religions but not others violated the First Amendment.76 
The federal district court ruled against Summum, but the Tenth Circuit 
reversed and found that the government engaged in impermissible content-based 
discrimination by denying access to the Summum monument, but permitting the 
Ten Commandments display.77 The Supreme Court unanimously reversed and 
ruled in favor of the City of Pleasant Grove, with Justice Alito writing for the 
                                                                                                            
  68. Also in Rumsfeld v. Forum for Academic & Institutional Rights, Inc., 547 
U.S. 47 (2006), the Court expressly professed the need for deference to the government and 
upheld a federal law requiring universities to allow military recruiters equal access to 
campus interviewing as a condition for receipt of federal funds. The Court rejected the 
claim that this violated the First Amendment rights of universities by compelling speech and 
association. Id. at 62. 
  69. Pleasant Grove City, Utah v. Summum, 129 S. Ct. 1125, 1132 (2009); see 
also Johanns v. Livestock Mktg. Ass’n, 544 U.S. 550, 553 (2005) (holding that the 
government’s speech is exempt from First Amendment analysis). 
  70. 129 S. Ct. 1125. 
  71. Id. at 1129. 
  72. Id. 
  73. Id. 
  74. Id. at 1129–30. 
  75. Id. at 1130. 
  76. Id.  
  77. Id.; Summum v. Pleasant Grove City, 483 F.3d 1044 (10th Cir. 2007); 
Summum v. Pleasant Grove City, No. 2:05CV00638, 2006 WL 3421838 (D. Utah Nov. 22, 
2006). 
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Court.78 The Court held that by allowing placement of donated permanent 
monuments in a public park, the city was exercising a form of government speech 
not subject to scrutiny under the Free Speech Clause.79 
Justice Alito began by declaring that “[t]he Free Speech Clause restricts 
government regulation of private speech; it does not regulate government 
speech.”80 The Court quoted its prior decision in Johanns v. Livestock Marketing 
Ass’n,81 declaring that “[t]he Government’s own speech . . . is exempt from First 
Amendment scrutiny.”82 Justice Alito also explained that “[a] government entity 
may exercise this same freedom to express its views when it receives assistance 
from private sources for the purpose of delivering a government-controlled 
message.”83 In other words, the fact that the Ten Commandments monument had 
been donated by a private group did not prevent the government from adopting it 
and making it government speech. Justice Alito declared: “[I]t is clear that the 
monuments in Pleasant Grove’s Pioneer Park represent government speech.”84 
This is not the first case to invoke the notion that the First Amendment 
does not apply when the government is the speaker; Rust v. Sullivan85 and 
Livestock Marketing,86 discussed above, also use this rationale. But Pleasant 
Grove is the first time that the Court has said that the government can adopt 
private speech as its own and thereby avoid the First Amendment. 
This conception of government speech has potentially broad implications. 
Imagine if a city were to allow a pro-war demonstration in a city park while 
denying access to an anti-war demonstration. This obviously would be 
unconstitutional viewpoint discrimination. But, what if the City Council were to 
say that it was adopting the pro-war speech as its own message? In Pleasant 
Grove, there was not even a formal adoption of the private speech as government 
expression.87 This hypothetical seems indistinguishable from the facts of Pleasant 
Grove. The Supreme Court’s decision thus opens the door for the government to 
engage in viewpoint discrimination, which otherwise would be clearly 
unconstitutional, simply by adopting one side’s speech as its own. 
Justice Alito recognized the “legitimate concern” that the “government 
speech doctrine not be used as a subterfuge for favoring certain private speakers 
over others based on viewpoint.”88 But, it is not clear how this can be done under 
the principle that the government can adopt private speech as government speech 
so that the First Amendment then does not apply. A distinction can be drawn 
between the permanent monument in Pleasant Grove and a transitory 
                                                                                                            
  78. Pleasant Grove, 129 S. Ct. at 1130. 
  79. Id. at 1134. 
  80. Id. at 1131.  
  81. 544 U.S. 550, 553 (2005).  
  82. Pleasant Grove, 129 S. Ct. at 1131. 
  83. Id. at 1132.  
  84. Id. at 1134.  
  85. 500 U.S. 173, 192–93 (1991).  
  86. 544 U.S. at 553. 
  87. See 129 S. Ct. at 1134. 
  88. Id.   
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demonstration, but it is not clear why that should matter under the First 
Amendment. This problem led Justice Stevens in a concurring opinion to express 
concern about the “recently minted government speech doctrine.”89 
Certainly the government and government officials can engage in speech. 
The Court’s key failure in Pleasant Grove was in not distinguishing between the 
government as the speaker as opposed to the government providing a forum for 
speech. It seems clear that the government was doing the latter by allowing 
monuments to be placed in the city’s park. The Court should narrow the 
circumstances when the government is viewed as the speaker because doing so 
takes matters entirely outside the realm of the First Amendment. But the Supreme 
Court in Pleasant Grove did just the opposite. 
III. WHAT ABOUT CAMPAIGN FINANCE? 
One area where the Roberts Court has uniformly ruled in favor of free 
speech claims is in challenges to campaign finance laws. There have been several 
such cases in the first six terms of the Roberts Court, and all have struck down the 
challenged laws. In Randall v. Sorrell, the Court found Vermont’s limits on 
contributions to be so restrictive as to violate the First Amendment.90 In Federal 
Election Commission v. Wisconsin Right to Life, Inc., the Court held that the 
restrictions on independent expenditures by corporations and unions were limited 
to the functional equivalent of express advocacy and to speech that would be 
understood by a reasonable person as an appeal to vote for or against a specific 
candidate.91 Most famously and most importantly, the Court in Citizens United v. 
Federal Election Commission held that corporations, and by implication unions, 
have the First Amendment right to engage in unlimited independent expenditures 
to have candidates for public office elected or defeated.92 
The premise of these cases is that spending money in election campaigns 
is speech. The Court held this in Buckley v. Valeo, and it is the foundation for the 
Roberts Court decisions.93 But the Court’s treatment of spending money as speech, 
rather than as conduct that communicates, is questionable.94 Spending money may 
facilitate speech, and it is a way of expressing support for a candidate, but it is not 
itself speech. Justice Stevens expressed this well: 
Money is property; it is not speech.  
Speech has the power to inspire volunteers to perform a 
multitude of tasks on a campaign trail, on a battleground, or even on 
a football field. Money, meanwhile, has the power to pay hired 
laborers to perform the same tasks. It does not follow, however, that 
the First Amendment provides the same measure of protection to the 
                                                                                                            
  89. Id. at 1139 (Stevens, J., concurring). 
  90. 548 U.S. 230 (2006).  
  91. 551 U.S. 449 (2007).  
  92. 130 S. Ct. 876 (2010).  
  93. 424 U.S. 1 (1976).  
  94. See, e.g., J. Skelly Wright, Politics and the Constitution: Is Money Speech?, 
85 YALE L.J. 1001 (1976). 
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use of money to accomplish such goals as it provides to the use of 
ideas to achieve the same results.95  
However, even if one accepts the premise that spending money in 
campaigns is speech, two decisions of the Roberts Court suggest that what really 
animates its decisions is a hostility to campaign finance laws much more than a 
commitment to expanding speech. In Davis v. Federal Election Commission, the 
Court, in a 5–4 decision, declared unconstitutional a provision of federal law that 
allowed more spending in election campaigns.96 The case involved the so-called 
“millionaires’ provision” to the Bipartisan Campaign Finance Reform Act.97 It 
provided that if a candidate spent more than $350,000 of his or her own funds in a 
federal election campaign, then opponents would be able to take advantage of 
higher contribution and expenditure limits.98 If spending money in elections is 
speech, this law permitted more speech. 
However, Justice Alito, writing for the Court, stressed that the provision 
increased contribution limits for only one side in the election—a candidate’s 
opponents who spent more than $350,000 in personal funds.99 The Court said that 
it would have been constitutional if Congress had done this for both sides, but 
increasing the contribution limit for one side and not the other violated the First 
Amendment.100 Justice Alito explained: 
[The law] does not raise the contribution limits across the board. 
Rather, it raises the limits only for the non-self-financing candidate 
and does so only when the self-financing candidate’s expenditure of 
personal funds causes the OPFA [opposition personal funds amount] 
threshold to be exceeded. We have never upheld the 
constitutionality of a law that imposes different contribution limits 
for candidates who are competing against each other, and we agree 
with Davis that this scheme impermissibly burdens his First 
Amendment right to spend his own money for campaign speech.101 
More recently, in Arizona Free Enterprise Club’s Freedom Fund PAC v. 
Bennett, the Court struck down Arizona’s public funding scheme for elections.102 
Under the Arizona law, candidates opting to receive public funding receive 
additional money, up to a capped amount, based on the amount spent by or on 
behalf of opponents.103 In a 5–4 decision, with Chief Justice Roberts writing for 
the majority, the Court held that this violated the First Amendment by chilling the 
spending of money and thus speech.104 In the Court’s view, a candidate for office 
                                                                                                            
  95. Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov’t PAC, 528 U.S. 377, 398 (2000) (Stevens, J., 
concurring). 
  96. 554 U.S. 724 (2008).  
  97. Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002 (“BCRA”), Pub. L. No. 107-155, 
116 Stat. 109, 2 U.S.C. § 441a-1(a) (2006), invalidated by Davis, 554 U.S. 724. 
  98. Id. 
  99. Davis, 554 U.S. at 739. 
100. Id. 
101. Id. at 738.  
102. 131 S. Ct. 2806 (2011).  
103. Id. at 2808–09. 
104. Id. at 2828–29. 
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would be likely to spend less if he or she knew that would trigger more 
government funds for an opponent.105 Justice Kagan wrote an impassioned dissent 
in which she contended that the effect of the Arizona law was more speech, not 
less.106 Assuming that spending money in election campaigns is speech, the effect 
of the Arizona law is more spending and thus more expression. 
In both of these cases, a majority of the Court was concerned that 
candidates and their supporters would be discouraged from spending money if they 
knew that it would trigger public funding for opponents. This would be a loss of 
speech. However, the additional public funding would mean more speech by the 
opponents, which could then very well lead to additional expenditures by the 
candidate not receiving public funds. The overall effect would thus be a significant 
increase in speech. At the very least, the Court had no evidence before it that such 
public funding laws actually decrease speech rather than increase it. Nonetheless, 
the Court declared the laws unconstitutional. The conclusion is that these cases 
reflect a Court that is hostile to campaign finance laws—especially those 
restricting spending by corporations and the rich—much more than it is committed 
to freedom of speech. 
CONCLUSION 
Some Roberts Court decisions have been protective of speech, such as the 
rulings in Snyder v. Phelps and Brown v. Entertainment Merchants Ass’n. But a 
look at the overall pattern of Roberts Court rulings on speech yields a clear and 
disturbing conclusion: it is not a free speech Court. 
 
                                                                                                            
105. Id. at 2823–24. 
106. Id. at 2844–46 (Kagan, J., dissenting).  
